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  Abstract 
Under which conditions is moral justification of taxation possible? This question does not 
only interest philosophers and economists from a scientific point of view, but can have con-
siderable practical relevance as well because the willingness of citizens to pay taxes may de-
pend upon whether they consider taxation to be morally justified or not. We first consider 
theoretical arguments on the role of tax morale, and when tax evasion might be considered 
as justified by citizens or not. Then we ask how tax morale can be measured. Next, we 
discuss the role of tax morale for the shadow economy, before determinants of tax morale 
and empirical results for the impact of tax morale on tax compliance are discussed. For a 
high tax morale, institutional and cultural factors are at least as important as economic 
incentives.  
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JEL Classification 
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 1  Introduction 
[1] Following a usual distinction, the shadow economy can be divided into three parts: (i) 
pure tax evasion, i.e., legal activities are legally performed but no taxes are paid; (ii) the black 
economy, where legal activities are illegally performed; and (iii) criminal, i.e., illegal activi 
ties.
1) Taxes are evaded not only in the first area, but also whenever activities are illegally per 
formed. Thus, activities in the shadow economy are always connected with tax evasion, and 
factors influencing the latter will also always have an impact on the former. 
[2] If we put to one side financial psychology which has been all but forgotten today,
2) moral 
factors have scarcely been taken into account when the behaviour of taxpayers has been ana 
lysed.
3) Following the economic theory of criminal behaviour the extent to which citizens pay 
or evade taxes depends on a simple cost benefit calculus: The additional income by not pay 
ing taxes is compared with the expected punishment, i.e., the product of the expected punish 
ment and the probability that this punishment will be executed.
4) As many investigations 
show, this model identifies two important factors, but is unable to explain the behaviour of 
taxpayers: given the low probability of detection citizens should pay much less tax than they 
actually do.
5) 
[3] In order to correctly pay their taxes, individuals must have a motivation which includes 
more than the simple economic calculus; other factors also play an important role. If we still 
assume that citizens’ behaviour is rational, it has to be moral behaviour.
6) Thus, it is not by 
chance that we speak of tax morale, i.e., we assume that citizens consider it – under certain 
circumstances – as being their moral duty to pay their taxes even if – from a purely economic 
point of view – it would be profitable to try to evade them.  
[4] As R.W. MCGEE (2006) shows with reference to M.T. CROWE (1944), there exist three 
ethical (moral) positions with respect to tax evasion: (i) it can be judged as being categorically 
unethical, i.e., there is no justification at all for tax evasion; (ii) it is generally allowed, be 
                                                 
  1. On the definition of the shadow or underground economy see, for example, G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1984, p. 
379). 
  2. On financial psychology see, for example, G. SCHMÖLDERS (1981). 
  3. There is, for example, only a rather small section on moral aspects of taxpayer behaviour in the survey on 
tax compliance by J. ANDREONI, B. ERARD and J. FEINSTEIN (1998). The substantial literature on financial 
psychology  is  totally  neglected.  For  an  overview  of  earlier  contributions  to  tax  morality  see  also  E. 
SCHÖBEL (2005). 
  4. On the (traditional) economic theory of tax evasion see, for example, V. TANZI (1993), the classical contri 
bution by M.G. ALLINGHAM and A. SANDMO (1972) as well as W. RICHTER (2010).  
  5. This holds, at least as long as we do not assume extreme risk aversion. See, for this, for the United States J. 
ALM,  G.H.  MCCLELLAND  and  W.D.  SCHULZE  (1992),  or  for  Switzerland  W.W.  POMMEREHNE  and  H. 
WECK HANNEMANN (1996). M.J. GRAETZ and L.L. WILDE (1985) call the statement that tax evasion is a 
good example to apply the economic theory of criminal behaviour a “myth”. 
  6. On the definition of moral behaviour see G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2010). – 2 – 
   
cause the government is viewed as a thief which confiscates assets; and (iii) that whether tax 
evasion is ethical or unethical depends on the concrete circumstances. To the latter belong, for 
example, whether the tax system is considered as fair or unfair, what is done with the tax 
revenue, and as first mentioned by H. WECK HANNEMANN and W.W. POMMEREHNE (1989), 
how far taxpayers can influence what is done with their tax money.
7)  
[5] What is, however, ‘tax morale’, and how can it be measured? In the German speaking 
countries  in  particular,  there  is  often  a  misunderstanding  because  tax  morale  is  (largely) 
equated with tax compliance. But while the former is a moral attitude, the latter is concrete 
behaviour, and both do not necessarily coincide. In the following, we first consider theoretical 
arguments on the role of tax morale, and under which conditions tax evasion might be consid 
ered to be justified by citizens or not (Section 2). Then we ask how tax morale can be meas 
ured (Section 3). In Section 4, we discuss the role of tax morale for the shadow economy. In 
Section 5, determinants of tax morale and in Section 6, empirical results of the effects of tax 
morale on tax compliance are discussed. The results show that for a high tax morale, institu 
tional and cultural factors are at least as important as economic incentives. We conclude with 
some remarks on citizens’ duties (Section 7). 
2  Theoretical Considerations 
[6] As mentioned above, tax morale regards the question to what extent citizens consider it 
their moral duty to pay taxes. Considering it as a moral duty supposes that there are justified 
reasons to pay taxes besides the legalistic ones. What these reasons are, i.e., under which con 
ditions paying taxes can be considered as the moral duty of citizens (and under which condi 
tions tax evasion might be justified) is not only a problem discussed in economics, but has 
also been discussed for a long time in philosophy and, in particular, in theology.
8)  
[7] Taxes are prices for the goods and services provided by the government. The relevant 
question for the moral evaluation of taxes is whether this price corresponds to the value of 
these services, i.e., whether it is ‘just’ in this sense. This approach of the ‘just price’ also 
holds for the principles of taxation developed in the nineteenth century which today are still to 
be found in textbooks of public finance, especially the equivalence principle, but also the abil 
ity to pay principle.
9) The fact that these services are not distributed via a market and that, 
therefore, no market price exists made a simple transfer of the marginalist principle scarcely 
                                                 
  7. See for this also B. TORGLER (2005). 
  8. See for this also G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2003, pp. 221ff.). 
  9. See, for example, R.A. MUSGRAVE and P.B. MUSGRAVE (1984, pp. 227ff.). – The basic considerations can 
be traced back to the Nicomachean Ethics (1131a, p. 106) of ARISTOTLE who, when discussing his concept 
of ‘particular justice’, distinguishes between a ‘balancing’ and a ‘distributing’ justice, depending on whether 
the exchange of goods is discussed or the distribution of means within a community. (See for this, for ex 
ample, R. HAUSER (1974, p. 330.)) This distinction is taken up by THOMAS AQUINAS in his Summa The-
ologica (III, 58ff., pp. 254ff.), in which he distinguishes between a ‘justitia commutativa‘ and a ‘justitia dis 
tributiva‘ (as well as a ‘justitia legalis‘). (See R. HAUSER (1974, p. 333.)) – 3 – 
   
possible. Consequently, the original formulations of the principles of just taxation refer rather 
to the average costs of the services which are publicly provided.
10) 
[8] That with respect to this problem – as is often the case in economic ethics – the discussion 
is based on the idea of the just price and, therefore, on the concept of exchange justice, has 
first of all a practical reason: similarly as regards the Pareto principle which, however, is 
much less far reaching, there is no serious dispute about it. In a specific situation it might be 
difficult to determine what the real value of the goods or services to be exchanged is, but that 
any exchange should follow the principle that taking and giving should be equivalent is hardly 
ever disputed.
11)  
[9] With respect to exchange justice both sides have to be considered. The supplier of a good 
should get a price which covers at least his (justified) costs. This also holds for those services 
which are publicly provided. Thus, public employees have to earn an acceptable (just) wage, 
but the price should not be too high, because public providers are wasting resources at their 
disposal, in particular taxpayers’ money. Those who use publicly provided services have, 
first, the right to only pay for those services they are interested in and, second, not to pay too 
high a price. The tax price might, however, be different for different individuals, depending, 
for example, on their income. Perhaps this should even be the case for going along with the 
principle of vertical justice because the willingness to pay for these services might – ceteris 
paribus – be a positive function of their income.
12) This makes it possible that – in principle – 
all citizens can agree to the package of services and taxes provided by the government.
13) This 
leads, in principle, to lower and upper limits of the costs of publicly provided services and at 
least also to an upper limit of the extent of publicly provided services.
14)  
[10]  Following these considerations, levying taxes is morally justified and, therefore, paying 
taxes a moral duty, only as long as those services are publicly provided, for which such a de 
mand exists on the part of the citizens and if these services are provided efficiently. In all 
                                                 
 10. On the history of the ability to pay principle see, for example, W. KOCH (1981, pp. 225ff.). Independent of 
this discussion, however, for the goods of public enterprises marginal cost prices have been advocated in 
modern public finance. See for this, for example, CH. B. BLANKART (1980, pp. 21ff.). 
 11. See for this O. HÖFFE (1990, pp. 92f.), but also O. HÖFFE (1987, pp. 382ff.; 1994). He considers the princi 
ple of exchange justice as being a general principle of justice which also might be transferred to the political 
area. He complements it, however, with a principle of corrective justice. See for this O. HÖFFE (1994).  
 12. For the distinction between horizontal and vertical justice in relation to the ability to pay principle see, for 
example, R.A. MUSGRAVE and P.B. MUSGRAVE (1984, pp. 232f.). 
 13. This has already been mentioned by K. WICKSELL (1986). J.M. BUCHANAN based his approach of ‘Constitu 
tional Economics’ on this idea assuming that – in principle – it should be possible to reach such a general 
consensus. See for this J.M. BUCHANAN (1967, pp. 114ff.) as well as J.M. BUCHANAN (1987). 
 14. There are also arguments in favour of a lower limit of these services. (See, for example, J. GALBRAITH 
(1958) and his arguments about “public poverty and private wealth”.) Taking into account the strong in 
crease of the government share since the sixties this might today, however, be of secondary importance in 
the developed industrial countries of the Western world. – 4 – 
   
other cases tax evasion might be punished, but from the perspective of the just exchange pay 
ing taxes is not a moral duty.
15)  
[11]  These considerations are mainly based on the equivalence principle. They are not only 
relevant for the supply of public goods but also for the redistribution organised by the gov 
ernment as long as this redistribution can be interpreted as being voluntary or as an insurance 
against risks in cases where no private insurance exists (or private insurance cannot be sup 
plied without making deficits).
16) For such situations, one might take on the perspective of the 
original position in J. RAWLS (1971). According to this approach, publicly provided services 
and their financing by publicly forced payments can be justified whenever the individuals be 
hind the veil of ignorance decide that it has to be done in this manner. How far this holds for 
the redistribution actually performed today is, however, open. As the discussion following the 
publication of his “Theory of Justice” has shown, there is a large distance between redistribu 
tion according to the difference principle of J. RAWLS (1971) and the utilitarian principle of 
expected utility maximisation favoured, for example, by J.C. HARSANYI (1975). This distance 
is scarcely narrowed down if we employ the concept of the original position, in particular, if 
we  assume  risk  neutrality  when  applying  the  expected  utility  maximisation  principle.
17) 
Whichever principle we use, however, it always holds that using the concept of the original 
position taxation can be justified even if there is no exact equivalent for every individual. 
Moreover, J. RAWLS (1971) provides sound arguments that individuals in the original position 
would choose the (or a variant of the) ability to pay principle with progressive income taxa 
tion. Following these arguments this principle can also be justified by the idea of just ex 
change. This is not contradicted by the fact that, when discussing problems of taxation, J. 
RAWLS (1971, pp. 245ff.) does not refer to the traditional taxation principles but only to his 
difference principle, and that he argues that – under certain conditions – even a proportional 
income taxation might be compatible with this principle. On the other hand, he also mentions: 
“It does not follow that, given the injustice of existing institutions, even steeply progressive 
income taxes are not justified when all things are considered.” The question of whether the 
income tax tariff should be progressive or not is for him a question “of political judgement 
and not part of the theory of justice” (pp. 246f.). The concept of a regressive income tax 
would, on the other hand, violate his ideas of justice and is, therefore, not considered at all. 
                                                 
 15. Insofar as tax laws are pure ‘penal laws’, the government might force citizens to obey, but it does not bind 
their consciousness. As G. SCHMÖLDERS (1951, pp. 18f.) shows, the moral theory of the Scholastic already 
knows this conception.  
 16. Following H. W. SINN (1997) most of the services provided by governments can be interpreted as being just 
such insurances, i.e., it does not only hold for explicit redistribution, but also for publicly provided goods 
and services. Moreover, these public services do only to a small extent crowd out private insurances because 
“the by far largest part of the social security system covers risks for which no private insurance is available” 
(H. W. SINN (1996, pp. 263)). This does not, however, imply that (all) individuals would voluntarily take 
out such an insurance. For the discussion of arguments in favour of voluntary redistribution see, for exam 
ple, G. KIRCHGÄSSNER and W.W. POMMEREHNE (1992). For the relevance of distributive justice for tax 
compliance see also P. VERBOON and M. VAN DIJKE (2007). 
 17. For the presentation of the two principles see, for example, B.S. FREY and G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2002, pp. 
35f., pp. 262ff.). – 5 – 
   
[12]  A progressive income tax might, on the other hand, also be justified if the citizens do 
not (only) take their absolute income into account but their relative income as well, i.e., if 
they compare their own income with that of their fellow citizens.
18) Empirical results show 
that this usually holds.
19) This also holds for Switzerland.
20) Moreover, theory of optimal taxa 
tion shows that under this condition higher marginal tax rates and, therefore, a progressive in 
come tax schedule, is also appropriate for efficiency reasons.
21)  
[13]  When applying the concept of the original position the two conditions mentioned above 
still hold: paying taxes is a moral obligation only as far as the citizens (in the situation of the 
original position) demand that the corresponding services are publicly provided and as long as 
these are efficiently provided. Under these conditions evading taxes is breaking a contract and 
might morally be qualified as being similar to theft. On the other hand, if these conditions are 
violated, levying taxes is an illegitimate infringement of the property of the citizens concerned 
and might also be morally qualified as theft. 
[14]  Such considerations can also be performed with respect to the concept of a ‘fair tax sys 
tem’. Citizens feel themselves more justified, the less they perceive the tax system as fair. 
New developments of economic theory have shown that arguments of fairness which tradi 
tionally have been considered as being unimportant have strong impacts on the behaviour of 
people.
22) This holds, as shown below, in particular in the area of taxes.
23) If tax compliance is 
to be high, one of the most important aspects is that the tax system should be perceived by the 
citizens as fair (or at least that it can be perceived as being fair).  
[15]  But it is not only the fairness of the tax system itself but also the trust in the political 
and legal system which matters. Citizens have to trust their political representatives and the 
tax bureaucrats to use the tax revenue responsibly. And they should have trust in the legal sys 
tem that they will be fairly treated should they ever have a dispute with the tax authorities. 
Otherwise,  they  will  hardly  perceive  paying  taxes  as  a  moral  duty.  Correspondingly,  H. 
HAMMAR, S.C. JAGERS and K. NORDBLOM (2009, p. 238) conclude that “it is important for 
politicians to be perceived as trustworthy in order to be able to collect taxes”.  
[16]  How people evaluate these questions also depends on the (religious) tradition or the tra 
ditional relation between political and religious authorities in the countries. It is to be noticed 
                                                 
 18. See for this A. BALESTRINO (2009). 
 19. See, for example, R. EASTERLIN (2001). 
 20. See for this D. DORN et al. (2008). 
 21. See for this M. BOSKIN and E. SHESHINSKI (1978) as well as N. IRELAND (2001). 
 22. See, for example, D. KAHNEMANN, J.L. KNETSCH and R.H. THALER (1986), J. BROOME (1990), J. KONOW 
(2003) or B. HOOKER (2005). 
 23. See, for example, M. BORDIGNON (1993) or M. VIHANTO (2003). – 6 – 
   
that tax morale is considerably lower in the Romanic compared to the Nordic countries.
24) 
This apparently reflects a different attitude towards the government. One reason for this might 
lie in the different religious traditions. Since the Middle Ages, in the Romanic, mostly Catho 
lic countries, there have quite often been disputes between the government and the church, 
i.e., between political and religious authorities which, for example, were rather vigorous in 
France and Italy at the end of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries. Partly, as for ex 
ample in the Investiture Controversy, it was forbidden by the Church to support the political 
authorities. In the Nordic countries, which, on the other hand, had a nearly completely Protes 
tant population, political and religious authorities had been unified since the Reformation; the 
king was not only the supreme political authority but also the head of the state church, which 
partly (at least in a formal sense) still holds today. Thus, an offence against the government 
was also a religious offence: a sin. This had a strong impact on the population in these coun 
tries, and there was no abrupt change in this respect once the importance of religion in public 
(and private) life declined. Seen from this perspective it becomes understandable that – ceteris 
paribus  –  tax  evasion  is  more  strongly  pronounced  in  southern  compared  to  northern 
Europe.
25)  
[17]  The opinions of citizens on how far these two conditions are fulfilled and, therefore, 
whether paying taxes is a moral duty differ also largely within the different societies. As we 
are never really in the situation of the original position but are always in the ongoing political 
process citizens might be strongly influenced by their social positions as well as their income. 
Insofar as this may be the case, it is hardly possible to concede single individuals an individ 
ual right of resistance which allows them to take their own decision to deny payment of taxes, 
even if some groups sometimes claim such a right for themselves.
26) That, on the other side, 
such considerations of justice play a role in political reality is not only shown by auditing in 
stitutions whose role is to fight the waste of tax revenue but also by a decision of the German 
Constitutional Court in 1995 according to which a tax rate for capital income of more than 50 
per cent is not compatible with the German Constitution.
27)  
                                                 
 24. According to the estimates of H. WECK (1983) the index of tax immorality was in 1978 20.6 in Italy, 17.3 in 
France and 14.0 in Spain. In Sweden, Denmark and Finland it was, however, only 4.4. Germany and the 
Netherlands had a middle position with 10.9.  
 25. This “North South gradient of tax morality” is, as G. SCHMÖLDERS (1981, p. 131) shows, also reflected in 
the languages of the different countries.  
 26. In the eighties, some German citizens claimed to have a right of resistance in the form of a tax boycott 
against the use of tax revenue for defence purposes. This claim was rejected by the Financial Court of Co 
logne in its decision of November 15, 1984 (V K 223/84). See for this P. SELMER (1986). 
 27. BVerfG 93, 121; 93, 165. The Constitutional Court states the ‘principle of property preserving taxation’. 
See for this K. TIPKE and J. LANG (1973, pp. 121ff.).– For Switzerland, H. KLEINEWEFERS proposed the fol 
lowing article for the constitution: “(1) Each individual has the right to the results of his work and his prop 
erty. (2) Nobody’s current income is to be burdened by direct and indirect publicly forced payments without 
individually equivalent services in return to more than one half.” Thus, he assumes that today this limit is 
often transgressed. See: H. KLEINEWEFERS, Das vergessene Grundrecht: Für ein Recht auf den Ertrag der 
eigenen Arbeit und des eigenen Vermögens, Neue Zürcher Zeitung No. 12, January 16, 1999, p. 29. – 7 – 
   
[18]  The question of how far citizens are able to influence the use of their tax money might 
also be important for their willingness to pay taxes. The more impact the citizens have on the 
size of their taxes as well as their usage, the more they can be convinced that they do not have 
to pay too high taxes and that their taxes are not wasted. Thus, in more direct democracies the 
willingness to pay taxes might – ceteris paribus – be higher and tax evasion lower compared 
to purely representative systems.
28) The federal structure of a country might have a similar 
impact. The more decentralised fiscal decisions are, the more influence citizens can exert and 
the more trust they might have in their political institutions.
29) 
[19]  Besides this, the willingness to pay taxes might also depend on the way citizens are 
treated by the tax authorities. The stronger their feeling that they are treated unfairly the more 
they believe in having a right to evade taxes.
30) Nevertheless, such an attitude is highly prob 
lematic because, as long as it is a morally relevant problem, tax evasion is not a problem be 
tween the single taxpayer and the tax authority, but between him/her and the community of all 
citizens. On the other hand, the tax bureaucrats have the (moral) duty to treat taxpayers fairly.  
3  Measuring Tax Morale 
[20]  Before we can evaluate the impact of tax morale on tax compliance, we have to measure 
it. This can be done by surveys. In the International Social Science Panel (ISSP), for example, 
the following question is employed:
31) 
A taxpayer does not report all of his or her income in order to pay less income taxes. 
Do you feel it is (i) not wrong, (ii) a bit wrong, (iii) wrong, (iv) seriously wrong? 
If we allocate values between 1 and 4 to the different answers, 1 indicating the lowest and 4 
the highest tax morale, we get an index with values between 1 and 4.
32) Switzerland, for ex 
ample has a value of 2.65 which is considerably below the average of 2.93 (with a standard 
deviation of 0.24).  
[21]  The question in the World Value Survey (WVS) is slightly different:
33) 
                                                 
 28. See for this W.W. POMMEREHNE, A. HART and B.S. FREY (1994) as well as W.W. POMMEREHNE, A. HART 
and L.P. FELD (1997). 
 29. See for this W.E. OATES (1985, p. 749). 
 30. See also for this – in a more general connection –  T.R. TYLER (1997): The more fair the citizens feel they 
are treated, the more they are prepared to fulfil legal obligations.  
 31. These  date  relate  to  1998.  See:  http://www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/issp/modules 
study overview/religion/1998/ (04/03/10) (question V16 for tax morale).  
 32. Here, we consider averages of the countries. The whole sample of the ISSP data comprises 39,034 persons.  
 33. See R. INGLEHART et al. (2004, question F116). These data, which relate to the years 1999 to 2002, com 
prises 89,678 persons. – 8 – 
   
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: Cheating on taxes if you have a 
chance?  
Those surveyed were given a 10 point scale where ‘1’ implied that tax evasion can never and 
‘10’ that it can always be justified. It is again possible to construct an index; its mean is 2.27 
with a standard deviation of 0.69. Switzerland, for example, gets a value of 2.65 and, there 
fore, ranked 60 out of the 80 countries considered.
34) 
4  The Role of Tax Morale in the Shadow Economy 
[22]  A low tax morale should – ceteris paribus – have the effect of making tax evasion high. 
Institutional (and other factors) might, however, have the opposite effect. Therefore, a low tax 
morale does necessarily coincide with high tax evasion. Thus, we have to ask for the effective 
impact of tax morale on tax compliance, which is an empirical question. To answer this, tax 
morale has to be recorded independently from tax compliance, and, together with other possi 
ble impact factors, should be included in a model which tries to explain the extent of tax eva 
sion. 
[23]  For the first time, such an investigation was performed by H. WECK (1983)
35) where she 
used, however, not the extent of tax evasion but the size of the shadow economy as dependent 
variable. To estimate the size of the shadow economy of different countries in order to make 
an international comparison, she uses the model approach for non observable variables. It is 
assumed that there are (measurable) impact factors as well as indicator variables for the non 
observable variable ‘size of the shadow economy’. The impact factors are the input variables 
of the model, they determine the size of the shadow economy, while the indicators are output 
variables, which allow to measure this size. The model is estimated using the LISREL ap 
proach developed by K.G. JÖRESKOG and M. V. THILO (1973) in order to estimate ‚linear in 
terdependent structural relationships’. It allows to derive estimates of the size of the shadow 
economy.
36) 
[24]  H. WECK (1983) uses as impact factors the shares of direct taxes (Tdir), of indirect taxes 
(Tindir), and of social security contributions (SSC) in relation to GDP, the perception of the tax 
burden, measured by the change of the share of direct taxes ( Tdir), the burden of government 
regulation (REG), measured by the share of public employees in the labour force, real dispos 
able income per capita (YDR), a ten year average of the unemployment rate (UR) as well as 
                                                 
 34. A more detailed analysis of the data shows that the rank correlation for those 28 countries which are in 
cluded in both surveys is only 0.546 and, therefore, relatively small. This casts some doubt on the validity of 
these data. Nevertheless, these surveys provide the only data available for international comparisons. 
 35. See also B.S. FREY and H. WECK HANNEMANN (1984). 
 36. F. SCHNEIDER calls this the MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) or DYMIMIC (Dynamic Multiple 
Indicators Multiple Causes) approach. See, for example, R. DELL’ ANNO and F. SCHNEIDER (2006) or F. 
SCHNEIDER (2005), respectively.  – 9 – 
   
estimates of the tax morale (TM) from survey data.
37) Besides a stochastic term (ε), these 
variables determine the size of the shadow economy (S). Indicators are the age adjusted male 
participation rate (MPR), the effective working time per week (TIME), as well as the growth 
rate of the – officially reported – GDP (GRGDP), always in addition to a stochastic term (δi, i = 
1, 2, 3). Using data for 17 OECD countries and for the years 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 
1978, she estimates the following model:
38) 
(i)  The structural model 
S  =  0.419 Tdir  +  0.090 Tindir  –  0.113 SSC –  0.042  Tdir 
    (2.8)  (1.1)  (1.2)  (0.6) 
    +  0.294 REG  +  0.136 YDR  –  0.078 UR –  0.480 TM  +  ε. 
    (2.4)  (1.4)  (1.1)  (4.5) 
(ii)  The measurement model 
MPR  =  – 0.080 S  +  δ1,  R
2  =  0.621, 
TIME  =  – 1.000 S  +  δ2,  R
2  =  0.419, 
GRGDP  =  – 0.198 S  +  δ3,  R
2  =  0.976. 
χ
2  =  61.5,   DF  =  52. 
In the structural model, only the burden of direct taxes, the extent of regulation and tax morale 
have a significant impact. It is important to note that the latter is significantly different from 
zero at a level less than 0.1 per cent: tax morale has the most significant impact on the size of 
the shadow economy. Thus, it should be obvious that its impact should not be neglected. 
[25]  How important this impact is might be demonstrated by comparing two countries in this 
sample, the Netherlands and Italy. Following B.S. FREY and H. WECK HANNEMANN (1984, p. 
46), Italy had in 1978 a larger shadow economy (in relation to GDP) than the Netherlands, al 
though the latter had a considerably higher burden of direct taxes of 16.1 per cent and the 
higher share of public employees of 13.9 per cent. (The corresponding figures for Italy are 
10.2 and 13.2 per cent, respectively.) The result is mainly determined by the considerably 
higher tax morale in the Netherlands.
39) Without including this variable it would not make 
sense to estimate this model. And this implies that it is hardly possible to capture the causes of 
                                                 
 37. Actually, she uses an ‘index of tax immorality’. For the construction of this variable see H. WECK (1983, p. 
91, p. 110) as well as H. WECK, W.W. POMMEREHNE and B.S. FREY (1984, p. 57.). With respect to its con 
tent this does not, however, change anything if it is taken into account that the sign of the coefficient is re 
versed. 
 38. See H. WECK (1983, p. 112) as well as B.S. FREY and H. WECK HANNEMANN (1984, p. 40), who use the 
same model. – The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the t statistics of the estimated pa 
rameters. DF is the number of degrees of freedom. The variables are standardised.  
 39. See for this H. WECK (1983, p. 119, p. 133). To estimate the size of the shadow economies in the different 
countries only the significant variables of the structural model are used.  – 10 – 
   
the shadow economy in an international comparative way without taking into account this 
moral factor.
40) Thus, also when using the economic approach, it makes sense and is, in many 
situations, even necessary to revert to moral attitudes of the population if the size of the 
shadow economy (and the extent of tax evasion) in a country is to be explained. On the other 
hand, tax compliance (as well as abidance by other laws) retroact on tax morale.
41) But then a 
more detailed investigation of tax morale and its determinants seems to be appropriate. 
[26]  Though its validity is not undisputed, in the last two decades this approach has widely 
been used to estimate the size of the shadow economy, in particular by F. SCHNEIDER and 
several collaborators.
42) As far as data are available, all these models use tax morale as one of 
the  explanatory  variables  of  the  shadow  economy.  Relating  to  our  question  of  interest, 
whether tax morale has an effect on tax evasion (and the activities of the shadow economy) 
the results of these studies can, however, at best be judged as weak empirical evidence for 
such a relation but not as results of strict tests.
43) The estimated values of the size of the 
shadow economy are linear combinations of variables including tax morale, i.e., the informa 
tion included in this indicator is already employed by constructing the dependent variable. It 
can, therefore, not be used a second time to test whether such a relation exists. Such tests de 
mand estimates of the shadow economy (or the amount of evaded taxes) that are constructed 
independently of this information.  
5  Determinants of Tax Morale  
[27]  What are, however, really the determinants of tax morale, i.e., which of the possible im 
pact factors are not only plausible from a theoretical point of view (and are, perhaps, morally 
justified), but are also empirically relevant? More recently, quite a lot of investigations have 
been undertaken, concerning rather different countries as well as societal groups.
44) The ne 
cessary data have been collected by surveys and experiments; as far as internationally com 
parative studies are performed the data mentioned above collected in the World Value Survey 
and the International Social Science Panel have been employed. 
                                                 
 40. The estimated coefficients are biased whenever a relevant explanatory variable is excluded from the regres 
sion as long as this variable is correlated with the included variables. 
 41. See for this M. ORVISKA and H. HUDSON (2002) as well as M. WENZEL (2005). 
 42. See, for example, F. SCHNEIDER (2005), F. SCHNEIDER and D. ENSTE (2000, 2002), K. CHAUDHURI, F. 
SCHNEIDER, and S. CHATTOPADHYAY (2006), or B. TORGLER and F. SCHNEIDER (2009). – For the debate as 
to whether this approach is appropriate see, for example, T. BREUSCH (2005) and the response by R. DELL’ 
ANNO and F. SCHNEIDER (2006). 
 43. This also holds for those papers where (DY)MIMIC estimates derived in other papers are used to explain 
the size of the shadow economy using usual econometric methods, as long as tax morale is used in the 
(DY)MIMIC approach to construct the dependent variables employed in these other papers. See, for exam 
ple, B. TORGLER and F. SCHNEIDER (2009). 
 44. See, for example, J.T. SCHOLZ and N. PINNEY (1995), B. TORGLER (2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005), B. 
TORGLER and F. SCHNEIDER (2007), B. TORGLER and CH.A. SCHALTEGGER (2006), S. Y. WU and M. J. 
TENG (2005), or R.W. MCGEE (2005, 2006, 2008). – 11 – 
   
[28]  Following R.W. MCGEE (2005, p. 27), the fairness of the tax system is one of the most 
important determinants of a high tax morale.
45) It is, for example, more important than the tax 
burden. Tax evasion is judged more to be morally justified the more unjust and/or corrupt a 
government is perceived. Those arguments, on the other hand, that do not relate to fairness, 
are least acceptable as a moral justification of tax evasion. 
[29]  ‘Fairness’ is, of course, a broad term that can include quite a lot. If we consider this in 
more detail, it becomes obvious that reciprocity plays an important role: tax evasion seems to 
be more morally justified (objectionable) the more others evade taxes as well (comply).
46) Be 
sides this, it is important how the taxpayers’ money is used, whether it is beneficially spent or 
futilely wasted, and whether the tax burden is considered appropriate for the services provided 
by the government. It is obvious that those (moral) arguments discussed in the previous sec 
tion really play a role for tax morale.  
[30]  While R.W. MCGEE is concerned with subjective evaluations directly related to the tax 
system, B. TORGLER considers, aside from individual factors such as age, sex, marital status 
and employment status, which are not to be discussed here, more general evaluation indica 
tors such as trust in the government and in the legal system. Both have a significantly positive 
impact on tax morale.
47) The same holds for the degree of decentralisation,
48) while public 
sector inefficiency has a negative impact.
49) Besides this, cultural factors
50) and, in particular, 
religious behaviour play important roles: religious people have a higher tax morale.
51) In his 
investigation for Canada (2003b, p. 296), Catholics have a lower tax morale than Protestants, 
                                                 
 45. The results of R.W. MCGEE (2005a) are based on surveys among members of internationally active manager 
societies. He obtains very similar results from students of rather different countries. Many of these studies 
are published in R.W. MCGEE (2008). – On the role of fairness see also A. FOREST and S.M. SHEFFRIN 
(2002) as well as D.D. BOBECK and R.C. HATFIELD (2003). 
 46. See for this also B.S. FREY and B. TORGLER (2007). 
 47. See for this also M. WENZEL (2004), who shows that tax morale is higher, the more citizens identify with 
their political community, S. Y. WU and M. J. TENG (2005) who point to the impact of corruption, as well 
as I. LAGO PEÑAS and S. LAGO PEÑAS (2008) who show that tax morale is higher the higher satisfaction 
with democracy and trust in politicians is. 
 48. See for this B. TORGLER (2005a), B. TORGLER and W. WERNER (2005), but also W. GÜTH, V. LEVATI and R. 
SAUSGRUBER (2005). 
 49. See for this G. BARONE and S. MOCETTI (2009). 
 50. See for this, for example, J. ALM and B. TORGLER (2006) or B. TORGLER and F. SCHNEIDER (2007). 
 51. See B. TORGLER (2006) in an internationally comparative study covering 30 countries or B.S. FREY and B. 
TORGLER (2007) looking at several East  and West European countries. On the relation between tax morale 
and religiosity in Germany see A. PRINZ (2004) as well as L.P. FELD, B. TORGLER and B. DONG (2008). A. 
PRINZ shows that religious attitudes strongly influence tax morale, with a significant difference between 
West and East Germany. In West Germany religious education seems to be most important, while in East 
Germany it is personal conviction. L.P. FELD, B. TORGLER and B. DONG (2008) show that church attendance 
had a positive and highly significant impact on tax morale in 1990 and 1997, while its impact in 1999 was 
insignificantly negative. This difference casts, however, severe doubts on the validity of these estimates, be 
cause it is hardly plausible that the preferences of the German population changed that drastically within 
only two years. – 12 – 
   
but it is open whether the difference is statistically significant.
52) On the other hand, the com 
parative study by J. ALM and B. TORGLER (2006) shows that those indicators which represent 
cultural factors have a relatively high impact in ‘Catholic’ countries.  
[31]  We take the results of B. TORGLER (2005) for Switzerland as an example. He investi 
gates the impact of direct democratic rights on tax morale.
53) Thus, this paper is different from 
his other studies (as well as the papers in R.W. MCGEE (2008)) insofar as, besides individual 
attributes, not only are subjective evaluations included in the test equations but so is an ‘ob 
jective’ indicator of the political system. He uses the ISSP data mentioned above. For Swit 
zerland, he has 1,068 observations surveyed in 1998. Dependent variables are the coded an 
swers to the question regarding tax morale. With ordered probit he obtains the following es 
timates:
54) 
TM  =  – 0.00004 P  –  0.001 FR  –  0.010 TR  +  0.104 DPR  + 0.093 TRU 
    (0.05)  (0.66)  (0.77)  (3.41)  (2.94) 
    +   0.085 CA   +  0.021 INC  +  ...  +  ε, 
    (4.75)  (0.96) 
with: 
TM  tax morale; 
P  audit probability, approximated by the number of tax auditors per 1,000 tax 
payers in each canton; 
SST  fine rate, approximated by the standard legal fine as a multiple of the evaded 
tax amount (in per cent) in the canton; 
TR  individual tax rate (in per cent); 
INC  the individual income class of the taxpayer (in 1,000 CHF); 
DPR  index for the extent of direct popular rights in the canton; 
TRU  measure of confidence in the courts and the legal system (ISSP); 
CA  degree of church attendance (ISSP).  
The index of direct popular rights was developed by A. STUTZER (1999) and since then has of 
ten been employed.
55) It measures the degree of participation, with ‘1’ reflecting the lowest 
and ‘6’ the highest. It encompasses four sub indices: (i) constitutional initiative, (ii) legisla 
tive initiative, (iii) legislative referendum, and (iv) fiscal referendum. Besides these, other 
variables such as age group, marital status and employment status are included in the regres 
sion equation. 
                                                 
 52. The respective coefficients have opposite signs but are not significantly different from zero. Whether the 
difference is statistically significant has not been tested. 
 53. Similar results are presented in B. TORGLER (2007).  
 54. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the z statistics of the estimated parameters. – Similar 
results are provided by B. TORGLER and F. SCHNEIDER (2007). In contrast to here, they find a highly signifi 
cant coefficient of the penalty tax.  
 55. See also the description of this index in the appendix of A. STUTZER (2003). – 13 – 
   
[32]  Out of these variables, only three are highly significant with a positive impact on tax 
morale: confidence in the courts and the legal system, the extent of direct popular rights, and 
the degree of church attendance. On the other hand, those variables which are assumed to be 
crucial for the economic theory of tax evasion, the audit probability and the fine rate, seem to 
have no impact at all on tax morale. The impacts of the other variables are also not statisti 
cally significant, even if the signs are plausible: a higher tax burden tends to provide more 
justification not to pay taxes, and higher income, usually providing more possibilities to evade 
taxes, which are exploited at least partially, motivates people – at least according to the theory 
of cognitive dissonance – to justify tax evasion by de emphasizing its moral dimension. 
[33]  In order to investigate which of the four different instruments that are combined in the 
index of direct popular rights has an impact on tax morale, B. TORGLER (2005) uses the sub 
indices for additional estimations. For the coefficients of the sub indices he obtains the fol 
lowing results:  
  (i)  Constitutional initiative   0.051 
  (ii)  Legislative initiative  0.064 
  (iii)  Legislative referendum  0.088 
  (iv)  Fiscal referendum  0.090 
The coefficient of the constitutional initiative is at the 10 per cent level, that of the legislative 
initiative at the 5 per cent level, and those of the two referenda variables are at the 1 per cent 
level significantly different from zero. This indicates that a direct democratic instrument con 
tributes more to raise tax morale, the more possibilities it provides for the citizens to control 
public expenditure as well as the possibilities to raise taxes. 
[34]  The question arises as to what extent these results might be generalised and hold for 
other countries as well. With respect to direct political rights it might be argued that except 
for the United States there is no other country in the world which has comparable direct rights 
at the state and local governmental levels, and for the U.S. there are no comparable studies 
available. Thus, generalisations might be problematic. On the other hand, there is no reason 
why citizens of other countries should behave totally differently. Thus, the hypothesis that the 
introduction and/or extension of direct popular rights might raise tax morale in other countries 
as well can be kept, at least preliminarily. With respect to trust in the legal system the situa 
tion is different. This has been investigated by B. TORGLER (2003). Using the World Value 
Survey data for European countries and the period from 1990 to 1993, he finds that, inde 
pendent of the concrete estimation procedure, trust in the legal system always had a highly 
significant positive impact on tax morale. Using data from the Opinion Taxpayer Survey 
1987, he obtained the same result for trust in the legal system.
56) He obtains similar results 
                                                 
 56. There, trust in public officials is the explanatory variable. On the Taxpayer Opinion Survey see L. HARRIS 
and ASSOCIATES (1988). For a survey about papers which set the theme ‘trust’ in relation to problems of 
public finances see J. SLEMROD (2003). – 14 – 
   
also for Eastern European countries (2003a), Canada (2003b) as well as India and Japan 
(2004). Thus, it can be taken for granted that trust in the legal system has a positive impact on 
tax morale. 
6  Tax Morale and Tax Evasion 
[35]  If we ask for the determinants of tax evasion, we might first think of the individual at 
tributes of taxpayers such as, for example, age, education, employment and marital status. 
These variables are, however, rather uninteresting in this respect; they can hardly (or, at best, 
only in the very long term) be influenced by policy measures. If we use micro data, in order 
not to bias the results, they are included in the regressions as control variables. For similar 
reasons, when using macro data, it makes sense to use their means as controls. Besides these, 
there are individual data of interest, such as tax morale in particular, but also trust in the po 
litical and legal system, which however play hardly any role in the traditional economic ap 
proach to tax evasion. They depend on institutional conditions which can be changed and can, 
therefore, be influenced by policy measures. Thus, these institutional conditions have also to 
be represented in the estimation equations. Finally, there are the core variables of the tradi 
tional economic approach: tax rate, probability of detection, fine rate, as well as income. 
[36]  If we consider tax morale and other variables as determinants of tax evasion, we have to 
distinguish between direct and indirect impacts. It is, for example, a question of whether trust 
in the political system has an impact on tax compliance, independent of the moral qualifica 
tion of tax evasion. On the other hand, it is open as to whether tax morale has an independent 
impact once we account for all other possible determinants. This could be tested in empirical 
analyses, but is hardly ever done.  
[37]  Moreover, there are only relatively few reliable investigations concerning the determi 
nants of tax evasion.
57) Sometimes micro data can be received from tax authorities.
58) These 
data have, however, their problems. Because even strong audits cannot detect all evasions, 
these data underestimate the actual amount.
59) Aggregate data can be constructed by compar 
ing data for the national income (expenditure) from the national account with income data 
collected from tax declarations.
60) They rather overestimate evasion because not every non 
declared income is liable for taxation.
61) A third, but rather rare possibility, is tax amnesties.
62) 
                                                 
 57. Surveys are given, for example, by W.W. POMMEREHNE (1985), W.W. POMMEREHNE and H. WECK HANNE 
MANN (1992), J. ANDREONI, B. ERARD and J. FEINSTEIN (1998) as well as B. TORGLER (2001). 
 58. See, for example, CH.T. CLOTFELTER (1983), J. SLEMROD (1985) or M. WENZEL (2005a). 
 59. For this, see, for example, J. ANDREONI, B. ERARD and J. FEINSTEIN (1998, p. 836). 
 60. See, for example, the two papers on Switzerland by H. WECK HANNEMANN and W.W. POMMEREHNE (1989) 
as well as by B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002).  
 61. For this, see, for example, J. SLEMROD and S. YITZHAKI (2000). – In Switzerland, such overestimations oc 
cur, for example, because private capital gains are not liable for taxation. They do, however, hardly count 
for a very large part of the difference between declared income and actual expenditure. – 15 – 
   
Again the amount of evasion is underestimated because not all of those who have evaded 
taxes so far are willing to reveal their real income in case of such an amnesty. 
[38]  To circumvent these problems, survey data
63) and, more recently, data from experiments 
have been used.
64) But these data are also not without problems. Even under optimal condi 
tions, hardly all of those who evade taxes will actually admit to this if asked. Moreover, if the 
effect of tax morale on tax compliance is to be investigated, it would be preferable to collect 
these two data sets independently of each other. Data from experiments do not have minor 
problems. The subjects can lose money, which might be interpreted as a fine, but, first, it is 
money given to them before and not ‘own’ (earned) income, and, second, the possible loss of 
a small amount of money can hardly be compared with a real fine or even imprisonment. 
Thus, the results should be taken seriously, but rather carefully interpreted. 
[39]  The main result is, however, unambiguous: tax morale is a main determinant of the will 
ingness to pay taxes.
65) As was to be expected, the perceived fairness of the tax system plays 
an important role.
66) Moreover, there is also reversed causation from tax morale to the other 
determinants. As J.T. SCHOLZ and N. PINNEY (1995) have shown, the higher the perceived 
risk of being caught and punished when evading taxes, the higher the tax morale of an indi 
vidual. Finally, reciprocity is crucial. Citizens are more willing to pay their taxes, the more 
they are convinced that their fellow citizens are doing the same. M. WENZEL (2005a) shows 
that a systematic bias might exist: they believe that others behave, on average, less morally 
than they do themselves. If this bias is corrected, tax evasion declines.  
[40]  Those studies which used real data from the tax authorities first asked for the impact of 
those determinants that play a role in the traditional model, in particular income and the mar 
ginal tax rate. The results are heterogeneous. For the United States, CH.T. CLOTFELDER (1983) 
finds a significant impact of both variables, but J. SLEMROD (1985) does not. E.M.R.A. ENGEL 
and J.R. HINES (2000) find a significant effect for the audit probability, but not for the mar 
ginal tax rate. Similarly contradictory results with respect to fines and the probability of de 
tection have been derived for Switzerland. While H. WECK HANNEMANN and W.W. POM 
MEREHNE (1989) do not find a significant impact of fines, B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002) 
find a significant result. On the other hand, they get a significantly ‘wrong’ sign for the prob 
ability of detection. 
                                                                                                                                                          
 62. See, for example, S.E. CRANE and F. NOURZAD (1990) or J. ALM and W. BECK (1992). 
 63. See, for example, M. OVRISKA and J. HUDSON (2002), A. FOREST and S.M. SHEFFRIN (2002) or H. HAM 
MAR, S.C. JAGERS and K. NORDBLOM (2009). – On the measurement of tax compliance using survey data 
see also E. KIRCHLER and I. WAHL (2010). 
 64. See, for example, J. ALM, B.R. JACKSON and M. MCKEE (1992), L. BOSCO and L. MITTONE (1997), L.P. 
FELD and R. TYRAN (2002), C. G. PARK and J.K. HYUN (2003), R.C. CUMMINGS et al. (2009), as well as the 
survey by B. TORGLER (2002). 
 65. See, for example, P.M.J. RECKERS, D.L. SANDERS and S.J. ROARK (1994), M. OVRISKA and J. HUDSON 
(2002) or D.D. BOBEK and R.C. HATFIELD (2003). 
 66. See, for example, A. FOREST and S.M. SHEFFRIN (2002) or D.D. BOBEK and R.C. HATFIELD (2003). – 16 – 
   
[41]  The two latter papers again employ, besides the variables of the economic approach 
(and further controls), the extent of direct popular rights as explanatory variable. In the paper 
by B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002), which we use as another example, treatment by the tax 
authorities is also taken into account. The proxy to represent this has been constructed on the 
basis of a survey among the cantonal tax authorities.
67) Thus, they take two aspects into ac 
count which are relevant for tax morale.  
[42]  With data for the 26 Swiss cantons and five years in the period from 1970 to 1995, they 
have 130 observations. They obtain the following result:
68) 
TE  =  0.066 P –  0.064 F  +  0.709 MTR  +  0.423 Y  –  1.038 TI 
    (2.74)  (2.48)  (4.92)  (2.20)  (0.91) 
    – 0.002 Pop  –  0.463 A65  –  0.678 SSE  +  0.403 SAS  –  7.432 Lat 
    (1.94)  (1.95)  (2.61)  (2.03)  (3.10) 
       2.291 ID  –  2.908 TypP  –  5.725 RespP  –  6.673 AutP  +  ε. 
    (3.14)  (3.49)  (3.84)  (3.31) 
    R2 = 0.798, 
with: 
TE  tax evasion; 
P  probability of detection; 
F  fine for tax evasion; 
MTR  maximum marginal tax rate; 
Y  gross effective primary income per capita in 1,000 CHF; 
TI  dummy for tax indexation;  
Pop  cantonal population (in 1,000); 
A65  percentage of people over 65 years in the population (in per cent); 
SSE  share of self employed from total employment (in per cent); 
SAE  share of employment in the agricultural sector (in per cent); 
Lat  dummy for French and Italian speaking cantons; 
ID  index of direct popular rights; 
TypV  index for the procedure if no taxes are declared; 
                                                 
 67. A problem with this data is, however, that – depending on the procedures in the different cantons – most 
taxpayers have no contact at all with the cantonal tax authorities but exclusively with the local tax authori 
ties. This also holds for most of those taxpayers whose declarations are – for various reasons – not proc 
essed by local but by cantonal employees. On the other hand, cantonal tax authorities have an impact on lo 
cal authorities, and some ‘big’ taxpayers might negotiate directly with the cantonal authorities. 
 68. Equation (4) in Table 2, p. 20, in B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002). The numbers in parentheses are the abso 
lute values of the t statistics of the estimated parameters. The equation does not include a constant term be 
cause dummy variables for the five points in time are included.  – 17 – 
   
RespP  dummy variable for a respectful procedure by the tax authorities; 
AutP  dummy variable for an authoritarian procedure by the tax authorities. 
[43]  As already mentioned, both variables of the traditional approach are significant, but the 
proxy for the probability of detection has the ‘wrong’ sign. This might indicate reversed cau 
sality: the higher the tax evasion is in a canton, the more it pays to employ additional tax col 
lectors. That a high fine has a significant negative impact on tax evasion despite the fact that it 
has (according to the result of B. TORGLER (2005)) no impact on tax morale, reveals the dif 
ference between tax morale and tax compliance. Repressive measures can, as other studies 
show as well, reduce the amount of tax evasion,
69) but this does not imply that citizens revise 
their moral convictions. And whether this is the most efficient way to reduce tax evasion is, at 
least concerning the results of M. KUCHER and L. GÖTTE (1998), questionable. 
[44]  The index of direct democratic rights has a highly significant negative impact on the 
amount of tax evasion. Insofar, we see the same result as in the earlier papers by H. WECK 
HANNEMANN and W.W. POMMEREHNE (1989) as well as W.W. POMMEREHNE and H. WECK 
HANNEMANN (1996). Those variables which reflect the behaviour of the tax authorities are of 
particular interest in the paper by B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002).
70) The more rigorous these 
authorities are if a declaration is missing, the more taxes are evaded. If the authorities detect 
an error in a declaration, respectful as well as authoritarian behaviour leads to less evasion, 
the former, one might guess, because trust in the cantonal tax authorities (and, more generally, 
in the public bureaucracy) is strengthened, the latter, because citizens fear repressive meas 
ures.
71)  
[45]  The big advantage of these investigations for Switzerland, be it those by W.W. POMME 
REHNE and H. WECK HANNEMANN or those by L.P. FELD and B.S. FREY is that the indepen 
dent variables are constructed using official data without using indicators of tax morale; the 
condition  that  dependent  and  explanatory  variables  have  to  be  constructed  independently 
holds. Thus, for testing whether tax morale has an impact on tax compliance and, consequent 
ly, also on the size of the shadow economy, these results are much more reliable than those of 
the model approach. We can, therefore, take for granted that tax morale has a significantly 
positive impact on tax compliance. While we can trust in this qualitative result, we have to be 
somewhat more cautious with respect to the quantitative (numerical) results. The reason for 
this is that estimates regarding the amount of tax evasion as well as the size of the shadow 
economy differ widely, depending on the measurement method.
72) Taking Switzerland as an 
                                                 
 69. See, for example, L. LEDERMANN (2003). 
 70. See for this also L.P. FELD and B.S. FREY (2001). 
 71. The estimated impact of respectful behaviour might, however, also reflect reversed causality. The less taxes 
are evaded in a canton, the less the tax collectors might feel induced to be very strict. – In a further equation 
using interaction terms, B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002, p. 20, equation (5)) try to show that authoritarian 
behaviour of the tax authorities is more likely in ‘representative’ and respectful behaviour is more likely in 
‘direct’ democracies. The results are, however, not so clear cut that this conclusion can be drawn.  
 72. For a description of the different methods, see, for example, F. SCHNEIDER (2001). – 18 – 
   
example, Table 1 shows different estimates for the period covered by B.S. FREY and L.P. 
FELD (2002). While the results for the model and the currency approaches are rather similar, 
the comparison of income and expenditure leads to rather different figures, which are about 
three to four times higher. These differences are too large to be only a result of the overesti 
mation by the latter method discussed above. Thus, not the qualitative results, but the quantit 
ative figures derived by these approaches (and used in further studies) should be interpreted 
rather cautiously. 
Table 1:   Size of the Swiss Shadow Economy (Amount of Undeclared Income) 
(as percentage of the official economy (total income)) 
Year  Method  Size  Source 
1978  Model approach  4.3  H. WECK, W.W. POMMEREHNE and B.S. FREY 
(1984, p. 67) 
1990/93  Model approach  6.9  F. SCHNEIDER (2001, p. 22) 
1980  Currency approach  6.3  H. WECK, W.W. POMMEREHNE and B.S. FREY 
(1986, p. 32) 
1990/93  Currency approach  6.9  F. SCHNEIDER and D. ENSTE (2000, p. 102). 
1970/95 
Comparison of  
income declared 
and expenditure 
23.48  B.S. FREY and L.P. FELD (2002, p. 36). 
7  Concluding Remarks  
[46]  Taking all the results together, despite all the problems discussed above, not only theo 
retical considerations, but also empirical investigations show that tax morale has an important 
impact on the behaviour of taxpayers and, therefore, also on the size of the shadow economy. 
Tax morale, on the other hand, depends on institutional conditions, but also, on how citizens 
are treated by tax authorities, by their trust in the political and the legal system, and by the ex 
tent of direct popular rights: the more citizens can take part in fiscal decisions, the more they 
are willing to make their individual contributions in order to finance the government.
73)  
[47]  Given  the  qualifications  discussed  in  Section  2,  paying  taxes  is  considered  being  a 
moral duty of citizens. Thus, this discussion is about the duties of the individual and not about 
their rights. Not long ago, at the beginning of the seventies, people were still rather sceptical 
about such arguments. Then, the emancipation of the individual was the main topic, and the 
accent was on rights which – according to liberal conviction – are inalienable properties of the 
individual. In contrast to this, when taking up office on January 20, 1961, JOHN F. KENNEDY 
                                                 
 73. See also R.M. BIRD, J. MARTINEZ VAZQUEZ and B. TORGLER (2007) who show for developing countries 
that accountability of the government has a positive and corruption a negative impact on tax effort. – 19 – 
   
had already made the following famous statement to his American co citizens: “Don’t ask 
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country!”
74) But the political 
philosophy of that time also mainly asked for the individuals’ rights and under which condi 
tions these rights might be restricted and asked much less for the duties of the individuals to 
their community.
75)  
[48]  In the meantime, the situation has changed. Firstly, somewhat more than ten years ago, 
in addition to the catalogue of human rights, a catalogue of human duties was presented to the 
international discussion. Of course, opinions about this enterprise are mixed.
76) Secondly, the 
problem of citizens’ duties is an important question discussed today within political commu 
nitarism, a movement which is strongly influenced by AMITAI ETZIONI.
77) The first version of 
the ‘Communitarian Platform’ developed by him contains the statement: “Paying one’s taxes 
and encouraging others to pay their fair share … are fully obligatory.” (1993, p. 18.)
78) The 
solution he strives for, to use moral suasion in order to encourage citizens to have more civic 
duty might, however, not be very successful. The same holds for the hope of W. GAERTNER, 
that “the sense for fairness, the feeling for justice as well as attention for and the compliance 
with laws” might be encouraged “by investment in the moral education of all members of the 
society”. (1988, p. 127.) Most such attempts to influence the preferences have hardly been 
successful in the past. 
[49]  On the other hand, at the beginning of his “Theory of Moral Sentiment”, ADAM SMITH 
(1759, p. 1) tells us that human beings are also moral beings, i.e., not totally reserved against 
moral arguments. How open they are for such arguments might depend on the institutional con 
ditions under which they act, and recognising this is a precondition for really understanding the 
empirical results presented above. In order to reduce tax evasion and following the economic 
approach, the appropriate way is to set incentives so that citizens have as strong a motivation as 
possible to pay taxes. However, as M.G. ALLINGHAM and A. SANDMO (1972) have already 
shown, a strategy which solely relied on these incentives could only be successful if the taxpay 
ers were extremely risk averse, something they hardly are now.
79) That citizens pay considera 
bly more taxes than is compatible with only acting in narrow self interest indicates that they are 
more strongly motivated by moral reasons than is suggested by the (standard) economic model 
of behaviour. Because this depends on societal conditions, policy can still be successful even if 
                                                 
 74. See for this J.F. KENNEDY (1962, p. 28). 
 75. This holds, for example, for the basic works of the ‘new contractarians’ R. NOZICK (1974) and J.M. BU 
CHANAN (1975). J. RAWLS (1971), on the other hand has a chapter about “duty and obligation” (pp. 368ff.). 
– For an introduction into these theories see, for example, S. GORDON (1976). 
 76. See for this: Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenpflichten, DIE ZEIT No. 41 October 3, 1997; H. SCHMIDT, 
Zeit von den Pflichten zu sprechen, ibid, pp. 17f.; as well as the discussion following the article in this 
newspaper. 
 77. See, for example, A. ETZIONI (1993, 1995). 
 78. See also http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/platformtext.html (16/03/10). 
 79. For more realistic theoretical models including psychological costs or ethical preferences see, for example, 
J. SCHNELLENBACH (2006, 2007) or J.G. EISENHAUER (2008). – 20 – 
   
it is (correctly) assumed that it is hardly possible to directly influence the preferences of the in 
dividual. If the willingness to pay taxes is to be enforced, a responsible use of tax revenue by 
the public authorities is necessary as well as a partnership relation (and not a magisterial one) 
between them. Moreover, federal structures might be strengthened by providing real tax auton 
omy to the lower governmental levels as well as giving citizens at least some direct political 
rights with respect to the determination of public finances. In all these respects, however, espe 
cially with respect to federal structure and direct popular rights, much could be done in many 
countries. The situation could be improved, i.e., tax evasion (and, correspondingly, also the 
shadow economy) could be reduced if there were real attempts to do so. 
Zusammenfassung 
Was sind die Bedingungen für eine moralische Rechtfertigung der Besteuerung, und welche 
Auswirkungen hat diese auf die Steuerehrlichkeit. Diese Fragen sind nicht nur für Ökonomen 
und Philosophen von wissenschaftlichem Interesse, sondern sie haben auch erhebliche prakti 
sche Relevanz, da die Bereitschaft, Steuern zu zahlen, sehr davon abhängen kann, ob man die 
Erhebung der Steuern als moralisch gerechtfertigt ansieht oder nicht. In dieser Arbeit werden 
zuerst theoretische Argumente über die Rolle der Steuermoral und die Frage, wann Steuerhin 
terziehung  moralisch  gerechtfertigt  sein  könnte,  diskutiert.  Dann  wird  aufgezeigt,  wie  die 
Steuermoral gemessen werden kann. Danach werden empirische Untersuchungen vorgestellt, 
zunächst für den Einfluss der Steuermoral auf die Schattenwirtschaft, dann bezüglich der De 
terminanten der Steuermoral und schliesslich über den Zusammenhang zwischen Steuermoral 
und Steuerhinterziehung. Dabei zeigt sich, dass für eine hohe Steuermoral institutionelle und 
kulturelle Faktoren mindestens so wichtig sind wie die üblichen ökonomischen Anreize, seien 
dies die Höhe der Besteuerung, die Höhe der zu erwartenden Strafe, falls die Hinterziehung 
aufgedeckt wird, oder auch die Wahrscheinlichkeit dieser Aufdeckung. Die Arbeit schliesst 
mit Überlegungen zu Rechten und Pflichten in bezug auf die Besteuerung. – 21 – 
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